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ESSAY

DO BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS EXPIRE?

ANDREW KENT†
INTRODUCTION
In recent weeks, a dispute has developed between the Obama Administration and lawyers representing detainees housed at the U.S. facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In court filings, the government suggested that,
once a habeas corpus case has terminated adversely to a detainee, the
detainee’s lawyers may no longer access classified information or meet with
their clients on the same terms that were allowed during the proceedings.1
Though the district court summarily rejected the government’s position,2
this seemingly minor dispute is just the tip of the iceberg. As Guantanamo
detainees’ first round of habeas cases come to an end, and as the U.S
military deployment in Afghanistan reaches its denouement, the courts will
have to address the much bigger issue of whether Boumediene v. Bush3
granted rights to Guantanamo detainees that have now expired.
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that Guantanamo detainees had
a constitutional right to habeas corpus review to determine whether they
were properly held as enemy combatants, even though the detainees were
noncitizens imprisoned outside the sovereign territory of the United
† Associate Professor, Fordham Law School; Faculty Advisor, Center on National Security
at Fordham Law School. Thanks to Abner Greene, Joe Landau, Ethan Leib, Deborah Pearlstein,
Martha Rayner, and Steve Vladeck for helpful comments.
1 See Benjamin Wittes, On Continued Counsel Access at Gitmo and the Government’s Filing,
LAWFARE (July 27, 2012, 8:06 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/on-continued-counselaccess-at-gitmo-and-the-governments-filing/.
2 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL
4039707, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012) (rejecting the government’s attempt to modify detainees’
counsel access to classified information and meetings with their clients).
3 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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States.4 In the Court’s view, the non-habeas review processes provided for
alleged enemy combatants were insufficient to justify the prolonged
detention of people who claimed to be innocent civilians.5 But now, several
years later, many detainees have had their day in court and have lost their
habeas cases; the federal courts have found them to be enemy fighters6 who
may be detained for the duration of the United States’ armed conflict with
al Qaeda and affiliated groups.7 Though the Obama Administration seems
content to avoid the issue for now, 8 future presidential administrations
seem likely to ask whether persons found to be enemy fighters by Article
III courts continue to have a constitutional right under Boumediene to access
the federal courts for additional legal claims, including habeas. If the
detainees’ Boumediene rights have expired, they would presumably have no
right to counsel either, hence the significance of the current dispute about
counsel access.

4 Id. at 798. The Court stated that “at least three factors [were] relevant in determining the
reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of
the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving
the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” Id. at 766. Relying partially on the finding that Guantanamo
was “[i]n every practical sense . . . not abroad,” id. at 769, the Court held that the Suspension
Clause had full effect at Guantanamo, and the executive and judicial processes substituted for
habeas were inadequate, id. at 792.
5 Id. at 794-95.
6 The Bush Administration used the now-familiar term “enemy combatants” to describe al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters, but the Obama Administration has dropped the term. As a shorthand
reference that describes both the detainees who fall within the war on terror detention authorization described in infra note 7 and enemy soldiers in prior traditional conflicts such as World War
II, I have chosen the intentionally generic term “enemy fighters.”
7 Under post-Boumediene law elaborated by the D.C. Circuit, the government may detain a
person under Congress’s post-9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) if the
detainee admits, or the government shows by a preponderance of the evidence, that the detainee
is, among other things, “part of al Qaeda or the Taliban,” Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402
(D.C. Cir. 2011), or that he “purposefully and materially support[ed]” al Qaeda or Taliban forces
“in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners,” id. at 402 n.2 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590
F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (authorizing detention “pending
disposition under the law of war” of any person who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided”
the 9/11 attacks or “was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners”).
8 The Administration recently told a district court judge in a dispute about access to counsel
that “[t]he Government does not contend, for example, that the right to habeas review recognized
in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), is extinguished once a detainee’s initial habeas
petition is dismissed, or even denied. Detainees retain the right, in appropriate circumstances, to
file successive petitions.” Respondent’s Combined Opposition to Motions by Detainees AlMudafari, Al-Mithali, Ghanem, Al-Baidany, Esmail, and Uthman for Continued Counsel Access
Pursuant to the Protective Order at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to
Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 3542496 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 3193560.

Kent.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

22

11/13/2012 12:53 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

[Vol. 161: 20

There is no easy answer to the question whether confirmed enemy
fighters have any right to continued court access once they have exercised
their Boumediene rights and lost. This Essay first highlights and frames the
question about the possible expiration of Boumediene rights, then sketches
how a court could answer that question. The Essay then demonstrates that
the possible expiration of Boumediene rights to court access raises questions
about the subject matter jurisdiction of the federals courts (as well as civil
capacity to sue, individual constitutional rights, and separation of powers).
Thus, the courts have a duty to raise the issue sua sponte, and the President
lacks legal authority to waive the argument. Finally, the Essay suggests
policy reasons why the executive branch might be wise to avoid an argument about whether Boumediene rights have expired.
I. THE D ETAINEES AND THEIR LITIGATION
As part of the post-9/11 “war on terror,” President Bush chose to detain
noncitizens accused of membership in al Qaeda or the Taliban at a military
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on territory leased by the United States
since 1903. The United States does not consider Guantanamo to be its
sovereign territory.9 Habeas corpus petitions were soon filed on behalf of
some detainees—a move the government resisted. In 2004, the Supreme
Court held that the existing habeas corpus statute required that Guantanamo detainees be given the chance to file habeas petitions. 10 As these
lawsuits multiplied, Congress responded by stripping the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to consider habeas corpus claims by alleged enemy combatants. 11 The detainees challenged the new statute as an unconstitutional
suspension of habeas.12 The Bush Administration argued that the detainees
could not access U.S. courts and had no constitutional rights because they
were (1) aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States, and
(2) enemy combatants in the custody of the U.S. military during wartime.13
9 See Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the Insular
Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 105-06 & n.13 (2011) (describing the history and nature of the
United States’ lease with Cuba for the Guantanamo base).
10 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (“[Section] 2241 confers on the District
Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”).
11 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 263536 (2006) (forbidding U.S. courts from hearing habeas petitions “on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination”).
12 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
13 See Brief for Respondents George W. Bush et al. at 9-10, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (Nos.
06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541, at *9-10.
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Though these two justifications share a conceptual link, they played out
very differently in the Guantanamo litigation.
For much of American history, it was understood that not every person
in the world could claim the protections of U.S. laws and courts.14 The
availability of rights under the Constitution and other domestic laws, along
with access to courts to protect those rights, depended on being within the
protection of the laws. Protection by the United States went hand-in-hand
with allegiance to it, and allegiance turned on both citizenship and territorial
location. Citizens of the United States were presumptively within the
protection of the courts and laws because they owed allegiance to their
country, but noncitizens were a different matter.
Noncitizens were within that protection only when they owed temporary allegiance to the United States. While present in the United States
with the express or tacit permission of the government, aliens owed this
temporary allegiance and they received the protection of the courts,
domestic laws, and the Constitution. When abroad, an alien owed no
allegiance to the United States, and U.S. domestic laws and courts offered
no protection to the alien.15 Until 2008, the Supreme Court consistently
held that noncitizens outside the United States could not claim protection
under the Constitution.16 Hence, the Bush Administration’s argument in
14 The following two paragraphs of main text are based on Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, passim (2009); Kent, supra note 9, at 123-32; Andrew Kent, The
Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1853-60
(2010); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 G EO. L.J.
463, passim (2007); and Andrew Kent, The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi
Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn]. The
conclusions of these articles, as summarized in the main text following this footnote, are not
universally shared. For arguments that, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, enemy
fighters and nonresident enemy aliens could seek habeas corpus, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY,
HABEAS CORPUS: F ROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward
White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA . L.
REV. 575 (2008), and Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941
(2011) (reviewing HALLIDAY, supra). For arguments that this was or would have been allowed
under U.S. law as well, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 275 (2008) [hereinafter Vladeck, Suspension Clause], and Gerald L. Neuman,
Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1 (2004).
15 Another reason why the Constitution was not thought to protect aliens abroad was the
fairly widespread nineteenth century view that all domestic law (including the Constitution) was
strictly territorial, that is, had no force or effect abroad. See Kent, supra note 9, at 123-26, 124
n.96. Some believed this concept of territoriality prevented even U.S. citizens from claiming
extraterritorial constitutional rights. Id. at 125.
16 The Court in Boumediene claimed that an important series of early twentieth century
Supreme Court decisions called the Insular Cases supported its view that the Suspension Clause,
and perhaps other individual rights provisions in the Constitution, has extraterritorial effect on
behalf of noncitizens. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 756-60. But my previous work has shown that
this proposition is simply not true and is not even an arguably plausible reading of those
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the Guantanamo litigation about citizenship and territorial location was
rooted in long-standing precedent and legal understandings. Though some
have suggested that the Suspension Clause is a structural separation-ofpowers protection that was available to noncitizens abroad even during the
era when they were understood to lack any individual constitutional rights,17
the cases decided before Boumediene took a contrary view of the Clause—a
view which was consistent with the Bush Administration’s first argument.18
Moreover, prior to Boumediene, there was an important exception to the
general rule that noncitizens present in the United States were within the
protection of the laws and courts. Until World War II, courts and commentators consistently held that enemy fighters could not access U.S. courts or
claim rights under U.S. law during wartime.19 Fighting war against the
United States was fundamentally inconsistent with allegiance to it and
hence no protection was granted, even when the combatants were located in
the United States. Therefore, the Bush Administration’s second argument
that enemy fighter status barred court access for Guantanamo detainees also
derived from traditional jurisprudence.

decisions. See Kent, supra note 9, at 110-15. In fact, at the time of the Insular Cases, the Court,
Congress, the executive branch, and leading commentators all agreed that the Constitution
did not protect noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of the United States. See id. at
120-21, 123-32, 134-36, 144, 146-49.
17 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Insular Thinking About Habeas, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL . 16, 19
(2012) (“[T]he backstop to Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Boumediene was the view that the
Suspension Clause is a structural separation-of-powers provision, and that its scope therefore must
be understood wholly apart from individual rights such as due process.”); Vladeck, Suspension
Clause, supra note 14, at 302-04 (arguing that it is incorrect for the Court to conclude that the
Suspension Clause does not apply to Guantanamo detainees simply because they are noncitizens
outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction).
18 The Supreme Court rejected application of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens abroad in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950). Earlier Supreme Court decisions are consistent
with Eisentrager’s holding on this point. See Andrew Kent, Habeas Corpus, Protection, and
Extraterritorial Constitutional Rights: A Reply to Stephen Vladeck’s “Insular Thinking About Habeas”, 97
IOWA L. REV. BULL . 34, 37-40 (2012) (discussing early twentieth-century cases that suggest the
Supreme Court did not believe the Constitution required Article III habeas jurisdiction over
challenges to executive detention arising in new overseas U.S. possessions, and, a fortiori, that
detentions in foreign territory would not implicate the Suspension Clause either). One case
sometimes said to support extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens, In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), arose in the Philippines and was decided when the Philippines
was actually still American territory (independence came in July 1946, after the Supreme Court’s
decision). In addition, the Supreme Court’s power to review Yamashita’s habeas petition by
certiorari came from a statute expressly granting such power, 28 U.S.C. § 349 (1940), and the
Philippine courts had power given by positive law to issue writs of habeas corpus. Because both
habeas corpus in the local courts and appellate review in an Article III court were provided by
statute, the Suspension Clause was not implicated.
19 See Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn, supra note 14.
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Despite this exception’s historical heritage and its invocation by the
Bush Administration, the second argument did not figure prominently in
the Guantanamo litigation. The crux of the dispute between the U.S.
government and the Guantanamo detainees was whether the detainees were
in fact enemy fighters or innocent civilians. The detainees argued that a
federal court using habeas corpus, rather than executive branch agents, must
make this crucial status determination.
Even the Bush Administration seemed to recognize that this would have
been a winning argument, had Guantanamo been located in the United
States.20 And so the hard-fought litigation challenging Congress’s withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo detainees focused primarily
on territorial location: did the fact that these noncitizens were located in
territory that was technically not under the full sovereignty of the United
States mean they had no right to access the courts and claim
constitutional rights, or was Guantanamo Bay tantamount to U.S. territory
where the Constitution required the military to provide court access
and other rights to aliens?
In Boumediene, the Court sided with the detainees. It held that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay,”21
and that the status review procedures provided by statute and executive
order were not constitutionally adequate substitutes for the habeas corpus
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.22 Crucial to this decision was the
Court’s view that “the United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction
and control over the base, maintains de facto sovereignty over [Guantanamo.]”23
After Boumediene, Guantanamo detainees litigated dozens of habeas
cases in the federal courts.
In a report published in early 2010, President Obama’s Guantanamo
Review Task Force declared that of the 240 detainees subject to review, 126
had been approved for transfer, but only 44 had been transferred to
countries outside the United States. 24 In addition, 44 detainees were
deemed eligible for prosecution in federal or military court, 48 were
declared too dangerous to transfer but not “feasible for prosecution,” and 30
detainees from Yemen were designated for “‘conditional’ detention” due to

20 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“All [parties] agree
that, absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained
within the United States.”).
21 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
22 Id. at 789.
23 Id. at 755.
24 See GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ii (2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.

Kent.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

26

11/13/2012 12:53 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

[Vol. 161: 20

instability in Yemen at the time.25 As of early fall 2012, there were still 168
detainees at Guantanamo.26 Many of those not cleared for release have
litigated habeas cases, and to date, federal courts have adjudicated the cases
of about 60 detainees.27 It is difficult to neatly tally “wins” and “losses” for
the detainees and the government in the habeas cases, but doing so is not
necessary here in any case. It suffices for this Essay to say that the federal
courts have determined that dozens of detainees are al Qaeda or Taliban enemy
combatants, a group I will call the “judicially-confirmed enemy fighters.”28
Before turning to the question of whether Boumediene rights have expired for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters, it will be useful to clarify
what kinds of claims these detainees might want to bring in the future. A
number of detainees have already brought suits for money damages
challenging various aspects of their treatment in custody, but Congress
withdrew the federal courts’ jurisdiction over these suits in 2006,29 and the
D.C. Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s act. 30 That
holding seems likely to be affirmed if it reaches the Supreme Court;31 thus,
damages suits are not an option.
25
26

Id.
See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL
4039707, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012).
27 See Clive Stafford Smith, Guantánamo Bay: Statistics, REPRIEVE (July 28, 2012), http://
www.reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/guantanamostats/.
28 There are two other classes of detainees totaling only a small number of individuals, that
are legally equivalent to “judicially-confirmed enemy fighters.” First, some detainees never filed,
or filed then dropped, habeas cases. They have conceded by implicit waiver of their right to habeas
that the executive branch’s classification of them as enemy fighters is correct. Second, a few
detainees are held pursuant to a judgment of a military commission that they committed one or
more war crimes. Such judgments require a threshold finding that the detainees were enemy
fighters. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(7), 948b(a) (Supp. III 2010) (replacing a similar provision, section
3(a)(1) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, and
establishing procedures for trying “unprivileged enemy belligerents”). Convicted defendants have
a right to appellate review by the D.C. Circuit and may petition the Supreme Court for certiorari.
See 10 U.S.C. § 950(g) (Supp. III 2010). As a result, an Article III court will have found detainees
held pursuant to a final judgment of a military commission to be enemy fighters, just like
detainees who litigated but lost their habeas cases.
29 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 263536 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (Supp. II 2009)).
30 See Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 319-20 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
31 So-called Bivens suits for money damages are highly disfavored by the courts today, especially when they are brought by noncitizens challenging national security policies. See Benjamin
Wittes, Andrew Kent on Al-Aulaqi and Bivens, LAWFARE (Aug. 3, 2012, 7:44 AM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/andrew-kent-on-al-aulaqi-and-bivens/. Even when Bivens suits go
forward, qualified immunity prevents many litigants from recovering. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). As a result, it is hard to imagine a winning argument that Congress had
violated detainees’ constitutional rights by precluding damages suits—suits that would likely be
blocked because of qualified immunity and limitations on Bivens. This is especially true because
the detainees are noncitizens outside the United States and, to date, the only constitutional right
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The most important type of claim that judicially-confirmed enemy
fighters at Guantanamo will want to bring is a second round of habeas
challenges to either the factual or legal basis of their detentions. When facts
change—for instance, if newly discovered information showed that a
detainee was not in fact an enemy fighter—the detainees and their counsel
will want to return to court. Once the United States withdraws from its
combat mission in Afghanistan, Taliban detainees at Guantanamo will most
likely claim that the factual predicate for their detention has ended.32 Given
the United States’ success in eliminating al Qaeda fighters, including many
top leaders, detainees held because of their al Qaeda associations might in
the future claim that America’s war with the group has effectively terminated, ending the justification for detaining them.33 Detainees may also invoke
the Court’s language in Hamdi that suggested that, even if the conflict with
al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliates does not in fact end, “[i]f the practical
circumstances” of that conflict “are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that
informed the development of the law of war,” the “understanding” that
detention is authorized for the duration of the conflict may over time
“unravel.”34 Even without viable legal claims, lawyers for detainees will still
desire to represent their clients in other ways, for instance by pressing for
better conditions of confinement or for detainees’ release or repatriation.

that the Supreme Court has clearly confirmed they have is the Suspension Clause protection
announced in Boumediene. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (holding that Congress must “act in
accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause” if it intends to suspend habeas corpus
for Guantanamo detainees). It should be noted though that Boumediene and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006), are probably best read as implicitly granting Due Process Clause rights and a
right to raise separation-of-powers claims to detainees at Guantanamo. See Kent, Court’s Fateful
Turn, supra note 14. For an argument that the Supreme Court could decide the question raised in
Al-Zahrani, see supra note 30, in favor of the plaintiff, see Steve Vladeck, The Subtle New (Constitutional) Holding in Al-Zahrani, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2012/02/the-subtle-new-constitutional-holding-in-al-zahrani/.
32 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (approving
detention of an alleged Taliban fighter “for the duration of the particular conflict” under law-ofwar principles implicitly adopted by the AUMF). For a rich discussion of how changes in the
conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, including the removal of most U.S. troops from
Afghanistan, are likely to affect future detention litigation and other legal issues, see Robert M.
Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623.
33 See, e.g., Peter Bergen, Time to Declare Victory: al Qaeda Is Defeated, CNN S EC. CLEARANCE (June 27, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/27/time-to-declarevictory-al-qaeda-is-defeated-opinion/ (quoting the Secretary of Defense and President Obama
predicting that a strategic defeat of al Qaeda is within reach).
34 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion).
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II. HAVE BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS EXPIRED FOR JUDICIALLYCONFIRMED ENEMY FIGHTERS?
A. The Law Before Boumediene
Do the rights announced in Boumediene expire once an Article III court
determines that a detainee is an enemy fighter? There is no easy answer to
this important question.
Prior to Boumediene, three Supreme Court cases—all arising from World
War II—addressed whether enemy fighters could access U.S. courts and
claim rights under domestic law during wartime. The first, Ex parte Quirin,
involved German military agents who snuck into the United States on a
sabotage mission during the war, and who, once captured, filed petitions for
habeas corpus.35 All but one were German nationals; the other claimed to be
a U.S. citizen.36 The government argued that neither nonresident enemy
aliens nor enemy fighters had ever had the right to access U.S. courts or to
claim domestic legal rights during wartime. 37 The Court rejected this
argument and allowed the saboteurs to access the courts via habeas. 38
However, the Court did not explain why it overturned longstanding rules to
permit this court access.39 Later interpreters have understood Quirin to mean
that any person present in U.S. territory has a right to habeas corpus.40
The second case, In re Yamashita,41 arose in the Philippines, at the time a
U.S. territory. A Japanese army general was charged with war crimes, and
he filed a writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge his military commission trial.42 Over the Executive’s objections, but citing Quirin, the Court
held that the general could access U.S. courts via habeas.43 The third case
arose a few years later. In Johnson v. Eisentrager,44 the Court confronted
habeas corpus petitions brought by German military agents convicted of
war crimes by a U.S. military tribunal in China and subsequently detained
in U.S.-occupied Germany.45 Pointing to their status as nonresident enemy
aliens and enemy fighters, and their location outside the United States, the

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

317 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1942).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 25.
See Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn, supra note 14.
See id.
327 U.S. 1 (1946).
Id. at 5-6.
See id. at 9.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Id. at 766.
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Court in Eisentrager held that these agents had no right to access U.S. courts
and claim rights under U.S. law.46
These three cases were the most recent precedents concerning enemy
fighters when the Guantanamo detainees began to file their habeas petitions.
On one reading of the cases, the question about continuing court access
for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at Guantanamo looks straightforward. Just like the claimants in Eisentrager, the judicially-confirmed enemy
fighters at Guantanamo are (1) noncitizens (2) held outside the United
States who (3) either admitted, or were found by an Article III court to be,
enemy fighters. If Eisentrager was the most recent Court precedent, it would
be easy to say, based both on Eisentrager’s authority as well as on the
negative implications of the Quirin and Yamashita rule regarding location
within the United States, that the judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at
Guantanamo no longer have any constitutional right to access the courts.
But Boumediene has intervened. Though the Court there read Eisentrager in
a thoroughly unconvincing manner—as turning not only upon enemy
status, citizenship, and territorial location, but also on a host of practical
equities47 —it is now the law of the land.
B. Beyond Boumediene
Boumediene did not expressly address whether the rights it announced
would expire upon judicial confirmation of enemy fighter status. There is
language in the opinion suggesting divergent interpretations. The Court’s
holding was that the Suspension Clause “has full effect at Guantanamo
Bay,”48 and it seems to treat common law habeas as a baseline or floor for
the detainee’s court-access rights.49 As Professor Steve Vladeck has pointed
out, “in the executive detention context, it has long been recognized that
habeas at common law recognizes no bar to filing second or successive
petitions, including res judicata.”50 Therefore, the argument would go, the
Boumediene court-access rights of the detainees would never expire.
But Boumediene is more complicated than this reading allows, both as to
claims that might fall under a res judicata bar and to truly new claims. It is

46
47
48
49

Id. at 784-85.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762-64, 766 (2008).
Id. at 771.
Id. at 779-80 (describing the attributes of a constitutionally adequate habeas proceeding,
and noting that the exact requirements of such a proceeding depend on the circumstances).
50 Steve Vladeck, Habeas, Res Judicata, and Why the New Guantanamo MOU Is a Big Deal,
LAWFARE (July 17, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/habeas-res-judicataand-why-the-new-guantanamo-mou-is-a-big-deal/; see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479
(1991) (“At common law, res judicata did not attach to a court’s denial of habeas relief.”).
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true that the eighteenth-century common law tradition upon which the
Boumediene Court relied contains no bar to filing successive habeas
petitions, including res judicata. But that common law rule prevailed when
there was no appellate review of habeas denials; a new petition was the only
way to secure higher court review.51 Once appellate review became available, U.S. courts and then Congress shaped the doctrine of “abuse-of-thewrit” by essentially importing res judicata principles into the habeas
context.52 Applying this change to the common law in the Guantanamo
litigation—where appellate review for the determination of enemy fighter
status was available—would not seem to be foreclosed by the Boumediene
decision or any strong policy arguments.53 Therefore, res judicata principles
could be used to bar successive habeas petitions that raised issues already
decided or which could have been raised earlier.
And what about successive habeas petitions raising truly new factual or
legal claims? 54 Boumediene was premised on the recognition that the
detainees were requesting something exceptional. As the Court noted,
“before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained by our
Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure
sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.” 55 Whether their
exceptional claim to constitutional protection would be accepted depended,
the Court held, on balancing a variety of factors such as citizenship, enemy
status, territorial location, the military and diplomatic situation in the
territory of detention and other practical equities.56 Notably, many of these
factors are clearly likely to change over time—meaning that the Court’s test
contemplates that the propriety of recognizing exceptional habeas rights for
noncitizens abroad could change over time. One significant factor in
Boumediene’s test for whether noncitizens outside the United States have
habeas rights was the “status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process

51
52

See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 479-89 (explaining how the right to appellate review undermined the rationale for
allowing “endless successive petitions”).
53 The Boumediene Court recognized that the Suspension Clause does not mandate full-blown
common law habeas; it confirmed the long-standing rule that alternate procedures are constitutionally permissible if they are an “adequate substitute” for regular habeas. 553 U.S. at 771. As the
Court noted, it has previously sustained a statutory ban on abusive second or successive habeas
petitions in the context of state prisoners seeking post-conviction habeas relief in federal court. See
id. at 774 (discussing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662-664 (1996)). As the Court has said
repeatedly in the post-conviction habeas context, there is little value in allowing either repeated
bites at the apple or piecemeal litigation of claims which could have been brought earlier.
54 For predictions about what types of claims will be made in the future, see supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
55 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
56 Id. at 798; see also supra note 4.
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through which that status determination was made.”57 When they went to
the Supreme Court in 2007 seeking habeas rights, the detainees were not
enemy aliens because they were from nations at peace with the United
States.58 And crucially, they claimed to be innocent civilians.59 The executive branch had determined that they were enemy fighters, but only
through a military administrative process recently supplemented by limited
judicial review,60 all of which the Supreme Court found deficient in numerous
respects.61
Things are different now, and applying Boumediene’s test to these detainees’ changed circumstances arguably yields a different result today. The
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters have had their day in court. Those who
filed habeas petitions had their claims adjudicated before independent,
highly competent Article III judges sitting in the District of Columbia.
They were assisted by counsel. Their counsel, in turn, received access to
large amounts of information from the government, thereby allowing them
to contest the government’s allegations. And they lost—judges found that
the government proved that they were enemy fighters who could be
detained for the duration of hostilities. So today, their “status” is no longer
that of innocent civilian but of confirmed enemy fighter. And the “process
through which that status determination was made”62 was a fulsome, judicial
process conducted in federal court, not a deficient military administrative
process. Based on this aspect of Boumediene, one could argue that the
changed status of these detainees via judicial process means that the
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at Guantanamo no longer enjoy the
constitutional rights to habeas corpus announced in Boumediene.
But this argument for the expiration of Boumediene rights can and will be
challenged. If lower courts or the Supreme Court review whether
Boumediene rights have expired, they might well decide that there is a great
need for continuing judicial review of executive detention practices because
the war on terror is a novel conflict of uncertain duration with an everpresent possibility of overreaching or mistakes in detention decisions. The
Boumediene Court stressed that in order to protect individual liberty, the
separation of powers generally requires independent judicial review of
executive detentions.63 A court might hold that this structural need for
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 766.
For a description of Justice Kennedy’s reliance on the idea that separation of powers
demanded the federal courts’ jurisdiction see infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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judicial review persists even after judicial confirmation of enemy fighter
status. Or, a court might double-down on the view that Guantanamo is
quasi-U.S. territory and invoke the rule derived from Quirin and Yamashita
that admitted even enemy fighters of a hostile nation’s military have a right
to habeas if they are located within the United States.
The decision in Boumediene does not conclusively explain how the Supreme Court would rule on whether Boumediene rights have expired for
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters. My suspicion is that the current Court
would be exceedingly reluctant to relinquish the habeas jurisdiction over
Guantanamo which it so dramatically claimed in Boumediene, Hamdan,64 and
Rasul.65 However, both Boumediene and Rasul were 5–4 decisions,66 and so
future changes to the Court’s membership could of course shift the
balance. In recent years, Congress has enacted three important statutes
concerning judicial review of detentions at Guantanamo;67 thus, if Congress
chooses to address this issue again, future legislation could also affect
Boumediene’s continuing legacy.
III. MAY THE GOVERNMENT WAIVE THE ARGUMENT THAT
BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS HAVE EXPIRED?
The Obama Administration recently informed a district court coordinating Guantanamo habeas litigation that it will not argue that Boumediene
rights to court access have expired for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters.68 However, the Executive’s concession should not be the end of the
matter. In general, access to courts for enemy fighters and noncitizens
located abroad may be a nonwaivable jurisdictional requirement that federal
courts have an obligation to examine sua sponte. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent and unclear in its description of the
court-access inquiry, and have characterized it variously as an issue of
standing, civil capacity to sue, subject matter jurisdiction, separation of
powers, and individual constitutional rights.69 Whether a party may waive
64
65
66

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Hamdan would almost certainly have been 5–4 also, had Chief Justice Roberts not recused
himself because he was part of the D.C. Circuit panel whose decision was being reviewed. See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Due to the recusal, the detainee prevailed in
the Supreme Court 5–3.
67 Relevant provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 are noted in notes 7, 11, 29 and accompanying text, supra.
The third provision is section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd–2000dd-1 (2006)).
68 See supra note 8.
69 See infra Section III.A.
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an argument, and whether courts must sua sponte raise an issue vary
depending on which of these characterizations is correct. Despite this
uncertainty about general principles, court access under Boumediene is, in
the specific context of Guantanamo, an issue of a federal court’s subject
matter jurisdiction that almost certainly cannot be waived and must be raised
sua sponte by the courts.
A. Just What Kind of Right Is the Right to Court Access?
In a number of nineteenth century cases, the Court described wartime
court access for civilian enemy aliens as a question of “standing.”70 The
Eisentrager Court also used the language of “standing” to describe its inquiry
into court access for enemy fighters who were also nonresident enemy
aliens.71 If court access is indeed an aspect of standing, it might be a nonwaivable requirement that federal courts must raise sua sponte, just like
Article III and prudential standing under current doctrine.72
But it seems a stretch to equate court access with standing. The “critical
question” in modern standing doctrine is whether the plaintiff has “alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.”73 A detainee undoubtedly has a
direct and personal stake in litigation about the lawfulness of his detention.
In other cases, the Court has described court access for civilian alien
enemies as a question of civil capacity to sue.74 If that is the correct description of the court-access issue, the strict rules imposed by the standing
doctrine do not apply—a litigant may waive objections to the adversary’s

70 See, e.g., Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 421 (1864) (“Mrs. Alexander,
being now a resident in enemy territory, and in law an enemy, can have no standing in any court
of the United States so long as that relation shall exist.”).
71 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (“The standing of the enemy alien to maintain any action in the courts of the United States has been often challenged and sometimes
denied.”); id. at 777 (explaining that in order to find the German agents had “standing to demand
access to our courts” the Court would have to depart from all precedent and historical practice).
72 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (per curiam) (noting
that Article III standing must be evaluated sua sponte by the courts); De Jesus Ramirez v. Reich,
156 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that the court is obliged to independently examine
whether prudential standing requirements are met).
73 Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)).
74 See, e.g., Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 74 (1942) (stating, in a case involving court access
of a civilian, resident enemy alien, that "[a] lawful residence implies protection, and a capacity to
sue and be sued” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S.
279, 289-90 (1877) (“During the war, the property of alien enemies is subject to confiscation jure
belli, and their civil capacity to sue is suspended.”). Premodern references to “standing,” see supra
note 70 and accompanying text, are probably best read as referring to civil capacity to sue.
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lack of capacity75 and courts may, but are not required to, raise it sua
sponte.76 In some older American and English cases about civilian alien
enemies, it appears that judges allowed litigants to waive the argument
about court access.77 And at common law, the sovereign could choose to
grant protection, including the right to sue, to nonresident alien enemies,
who would otherwise be barred from the courts, based on policy considerations.78
Court access for enemy fighters involves issues of constitutional dimension, implicating war powers, separation of powers, and individual rights,
whereas today, an individual’s civil capacity to sue is a question of state
law.79 But this does not mean that court access does not concern civil
capacity. Prior to the 2006 jurisdiction-stripping legislation at issue in
Boumediene, statutes providing habeas and general federal question jurisdiction did not contain exceptions based on alien or enemy status. In the older
cases, the bar on court access for nonresident enemy aliens and enemy
fighters was said to arise from the common law and law of nations (today’s
customary international law); these limitations created implied exceptions
to both jurisdictional statutes and to constitutional provisions which
otherwise would have allowed court access, such as the Suspension Clause
or the Due Process Clause.80 The law of nations and the common law
applicable to cases about enemy court access were understood to be forms of
general law or state law, but not federal law.81 Thus the fact that personal
capacity to sue is a question of state law does not mean it is an inaccurate
description of the court-access inquiry.

75 See, e.g., Wagner Furniture Interiors, Inc. v. Kemner’s Georgetown Manor, Inc., 929
F.2d 343, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that a party must raise lack of capacity to sue or the
defense will be waived).
76 See, e.g., Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003)
(explaining that no federal rule of procedure nor any case precedent impose an obligation upon the
court to inquire sua sponte into a pro se plaintiff’s mental competence).
77 See, e.g., Levine v. Taylor, 12 Mass. (1 Tyng) 8, 9 (1815); Hoppen v. Leppett, (1737) 95
Eng. Rep. 305, 305-06 (K.B.).
78 See, e.g., Crawford v. William Penn, 6 F. Cas. 778, 779 (C.C.D.N.J. 1815) (No. 3372). See
generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE , COMMENTARIES *372 (“[A]lien enemies have no rights, no
privileges, unless by the king’s special favour, during the time of war.”).
79 See F ED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(1).
80 See Kent, Court’s Fateful Turn, supra note 14.
81 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 820-25 (1997) (describing how
prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), most considered the law of nations to
be general law or state law).
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B. Clues in Boumediene
There is language in leading Supreme Court cases suggesting that court
access might not be a question of civil capacity, but might instead concern
subject matter jurisdiction, another requirement courts must raise sua
sponte and that litigants may not waive.82 Subject matter jurisdiction refers
to “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”83 In
its brief reference to the court-access dispute, the Quirin Court discussed
whether the Court had authority to hear the case, perhaps indicating that
the Justices were thinking in terms of subject matter jurisdiction.84 The
Eisentrager Court repeatedly described the issue of court access as one of
jurisdiction85 and the court’s power to hear the case.86 Justice Kennedy—
who has been the crucial swing vote in the war on terror court-access cases
and who wrote the majority opinion in Boumediene—discussed Eisentrager at
length in his concurrence in Rasul.87 There, he framed Eisentrager as raising
a jurisdictional question and holding that “there was no jurisdiction for the
courts to hear the prisoner’s claims” because “there is a realm of political
authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter.”88 In
Boumediene, however, Justice Kennedy dialed back the references to
jurisdiction. His majority opinion repeatedly framed the issues presented as
concerning separation of powers89 and individual constitutional rights under
the Suspension Clause,90 while only occasionally referring to jurisdiction

82 See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004) (“Characteristically, a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct.”); Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998) (explaining that courts have an obligation to
inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte).
83 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89; accord Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243-44 (2010).
84 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
85 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (“The ultimate question in this case
is one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-à-vis military authorities in dealing
with enemy aliens overseas.”); id. at 780 (distinguishing other cases allowing access to the courts
because “[n]one of these heads of jurisdiction can be invoked by these prisoners”).
86 Id. at 771 (“[I]n extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has
been at pains to point out that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that
gave the Judiciary power to act.”); id. at 790 (“[I]n the present application we find no basis for
invoking federal judicial power . . . .”); id. at 767 (describing the lower court’s decision it reversed
as holding that “although no statutory jurisdiction of such cases is given, courts must be held to
possess it as part of the judicial power of the United States . . . .”); see also id. at 796 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (viewing the holding as going to “power” of Court to act).
87 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he correct course
is to follow the framework of Eisentrager.”).
88 Id. at 486-87.
89 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742-43, 746, 755, 764-65, 772, 797 (2008).
90 See, e.g., id. at 744 (“[T]he [Suspension] Clause . . . guarantees an affirmative right to
judicial inquiry into the causes of detention.”); id. at 770 (“It is true that before today the Court
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and the federal courts’ power to hear the case. 91 Because Boumediene
involved a jurisdiction-stripping statute and the Court clearly viewed the
Suspension Clause as supplying the removed subject matter jurisdiction (or
voiding Congress’s attempt to remove the preexisting statutory subject
matter jurisdiction), the Boumediene majority’s reticence about discussing
the issue in jurisdictional terms is odd. In contrast to the majority opinion,
Justice Scalia’s dissent (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito
and Thomas), and a concurring opinion of Justice Souter (joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer), framed the issue as primarily one of
subject matter jurisdiction.92
As noted, the Boumediene Court repeatedly relied upon the constitutional separation of powers. In prior centuries, courts have considered court
access for enemy fighters to raise separation-of-powers issues.93 Separationof-powers violations are not waivable and cannot be cured by the consent of
the affected branch of government.94 It has not been clearly decided, but it is
likely that federals courts may raise separation-of-powers defects sua sponte.
In sum, there is a decided lack of clarity in prior Supreme Court cases
about what the court-access question involves—standing, civil capacity to
sue, subject matter jurisdiction, individual constitutional rights, separation
of powers, some combination of these, or something else entirely. The best
answer seems to be that court access via habeas for enemy fighters or aliens
outside the United States is a mixed question of individual constitutional
rights under the Suspension and Due Process Clauses, capacity to sue,
separation of powers, and subject matter jurisdiction. But this lack of clarity
about general principles is not especially significant in the specific context

has never held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another
country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.”).
91 See, e.g., id. at 745 (“The [Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”); id. at 793 (“In light of
our conclusion that there is no jurisdictional bar to the District Court’s entertaining petitioners’
claims the question remains whether there are prudential barriers to habeas corpus review
under these circumstances.”).
92 See id. at 834, 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“And that is precisely the question in these
cases: whether the Constitution confers habeas jurisdiction on federal courts to decide petitioners’
claims.”); id. at 799 (Souter, J., concurring) (writing that “there must be constitutionally
based jurisdiction or none at all,” and finding that the constitution mandated the result
reached by the majority).
93 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 797 (1950); Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942,
947 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895); Lockington’s Case (Pa. 1814) (opinion of Brackenridge, J.), in
REPORTS OF CASES D ECIDED BY THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA , IN THE COURT OF NISI PRIUS AT PHILADELPHIA , AND ALSO IN THE SUPREME
COURT 283, 296 (Frederick C. Brightly ed., Phila., James Kay Jr. & Bro. Pub. 1851).
94 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986) (stating
that consent cannot cure harm to the “structural principle[s]” of the Constitution).
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of the Guantanamo saga, because Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping statute
and Boumediene’s rejection of it have made clear that court access for these
detainees does in fact go to subject matter jurisdiction. And that means that
the Executive cannot waive the issue. It also means the courts must raise
the issue sua sponte and decide the question of continued court access for
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters.
IV. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT PRESS THE ARGUMENT THAT
BOUMEDIENE RIGHTS HAVE EXPIRED?
Notwithstanding that federal courts have an independent duty to raise
this jurisdictional issue sua sponte, there are weighty policy reasons
supporting the Obama Administration’s decision to refrain from seeking to
bar additional litigation by judicially-confirmed fighters held at Guantanamo.
For one thing, consider the types of claims that such detainees might bring.
Under a 2006 statute, Guantanamo detainees cannot bring damages actions,
which leaves primarily successive habeas petitions. Habeas litigation
imposes significant costs on the government. It requires the time and
attention of executive officials and judges, money, disclosure of sensitive
intelligence information through discovery or court filings, and the sacrifice
of actions beneficial to national security not taken because of fear of
litigation implications. The litigation also creates a focal point for condemnation of U.S. policies by domestic and international critics. But these costs
should not be too onerous going forward because most were incurred during
the first round of habeas litigation and cannot be undone. The additional
costs of future litigation should not be too great given the relatively small
and declining number of detainees at Guantanamo. Thus if a detainee
previously confirmed by the courts to be an enemy fighter comes forward
with new information casting doubt on his enemy status, it is hard to see
why the government has a strong interest in barring that claim. If the
conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda peter out and the Executive
continues to hold detainees, the detainees will have a legitimate legal gripe
because law-of-war detention should end when the conflict does. If the
government believes that good policy reasons and sound legal bases remain
to hold detainees, it should probably welcome the error-correction and
legitimating functions that continued judicial review would provide.95
This raises another consideration: the domestic and international public
perceptions of the legitimacy of U.S. policies. It is widely agreed that
95 See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 188-201 (2012) (arguing
that counter-terrorism policies have gained significant legitimacy as a result of judicial review and
other means of accountability).
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Guantanamo harmed relations with many allies and angered some important
domestic constituencies. It is hard to see why the President would find it
advantageous to restart the controversy about Guantanamo being a “legal
black hole,”96 especially since the costs of future litigation for judiciallyconfirmed fighters will likely be much lower than the costs already borne.
***
For these or similar reasons, Obama Administration policymakers are
unwilling, for now at least, to press the argument against the continuation
of Boumediene rights. A future administration might well weigh the equities
differently. Whenever and in whatever precise form the issue arises, it is a
near certainty that courts in the future will need to decide whether
Boumediene rights to court access have expired or at least diminished for
judicially-confirmed enemy fighters at Guantanamo. The Supreme Court
may need to weigh in yet again. There are aspects of Boumediene and prior
precedents which support the notion that judicially-confirmed enemy
fighters lack any additional right to access the courts, but other aspects of
Boumediene, as well as some policy considerations, point the other way. The
legal battles about Guantanamo, which have already lasted a decade, are
likely far from over.
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96 Detainees’ lawyers are already arguing (perhaps a bit hyperbolically) that the Administration’s move to place some restrictions on counsel access for judicially-confirmed enemy fighters
who have no pending litigation has helped recreate “the status quo” circa 2002–2004 “when
Guantanamo was iconic for denying human beings legal rights or access to the outside world.”
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